Decision Sciences and Systems
Department of Informatics
Technische Universität München
Boltzmannstr.3, 85748 Garching
- Dissertation 1997, Habilitation 2001, Vienna University of Economics and Business
- 1997-1998: Postdoc, UC Berkeley, USA
- 2001-2003: Research Staff Member, IBM T. J. Watson Research Center, Yorktown Heights, USA
- since 2003: Full Professor for Informatics, TU München
- since 2007: Adjunct Professor at the School of Management, TU München
- visiting Professor: University of Cambridge (2008); HP Labs Palo Alto (2008); Department of Economics at Yale University (2016), Department of Economics at Stanford University (2017).
- faculty and board member of the Bavarian Elite Master program "Finance and Information Management"
- fellow of the Agora Group on Market Design at the University of New South Wales, Australia.
Market Design and Operations Research
Split-award procurement auctions: Can Bayesian equilibrium strategies predict human bidding behavior in multi-object auctions? (with K. Guler and S. Mayer), Production and Operations Management, 24 (2015) 6, 1012-1027.
Compact bid languages and core-pricing in large multi-item auctions (with A. Goetzendorff, B. Day, and P. Shabalin), Management Science, 61 (2015) 7, 1684 - 1703, 2015.
More than bin packing: On dynamic resource allocation strategies in cloud computing (with A. Woke, B. Tsend-Ayush, C. Pfeiffer,) Information Systems, 51 (2015), 83-95.
Ascending combinatorial auctions with risk averse bidders. (with K. Guler and J. Petrakis), Group Decision and Negotiation, 25 (2016)3, 609-639.
Efficiency with linear prices? A theoretical and experimental analysis of the combinatorial clock auction (with P. Shabalin, and G. Ziegler) INFORMS Information Systems Research, 24 (2013), 394-417.
Do core-selecting combinatorial clock auctions always lead to high efficiency? An experimental analysis of spectrum auction designs (with P. Shabalin and J. Wolf), Experimental Economics, 16 (2013) 4, 511-545.
Ascending combinatorial auctions with allocation constraints: Game-theoretical and computational properties of generic pricing rules (with I. Petrakis and G. Ziegler), INFORMS Information Systems Research, 24 (2013) 3, 768-786.
On the impact of package selection in combinatorial auctions: An experimental study in the context of spectrum auction design (with T. Scheffel and G. Ziegler), Experimental Economics, 15 (2012), 667-692.
Using matrix approximation for high-dimensional server allocation problems (with T. Setzer), European Journal of Operational Research, 227 (2012) 1, 62-75.
An experimental comparison of linear and non-linear price combinatorial auctions (with T. Scheffel, A. Pikovsky, and K. Guler), INFORMS Information Systems Research, 22 (2011) 2, 346-368.
Compact bidding languages and supplier selection for markets with economies of scale and scope (with S. Schneider, K. Guler, and M. Sayal), European Journal of Operational Research, 214 (2011), 67-77.