Ex-post split-award auctions are a widespread form of combinatorial procurement auctions in which the demand for some quantity to be procured is split into multiple shares. Markets with diseconomies of scale are wide-spread, but strategically challenging. We show that, unlike in single-object auctions, rst-price sealed-bid and the Dutch combinatorial auction formats are not strategically equivalent. While the former exhibits a coordination problem for bidders, the Dutch formats have only efficient equilibria. The price information revealed during the Dutch auction formats avoids equilibrium selection problems and helps bidders coordinate. Also, the theoretical predictions explain bidder behavior in the lab remarkably well. (joint work with Gian-Marco Kokott and Per Paulsen)
Maximilian Pohl (TUM): "Runway Scheduling under Consideration of Winter Operations"
We address the problem of scheduling incoming and departing aircraft on multiple runways under consideration of snow removal and runway de-icing during winter operations. Since this problem has not been addressed so far in the literature, we are presenting a mixed-inter program (MIP) with the objective of minimizing the weighted earliness and lateness of scheduled starting and landing times. We report about solving small real-world instances to optimality. Since larger instances cannot be solved to optimality with our current model, we will also be discussing advanced methods and heuristic approaches.
Venue: TUM Campus Garching Room 01.10.033
Date: Monday, November 20, 2017, 14:00